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The passage off the Interstate Commerce Act by the
United States Congress duritg the year 187 naturally leads
one to believe tuat the chant e in theoies for a century or
more, unquestioned, regarding the relationls existing between
State and citizen & being made simultaneously ,rith changes
in industrial methods.
Coingress, in the passage of this act, has asserted
authority over man acting in his private capacity, and in a
sweeping manner never before heard of. It is most improbable,
and I think I am safe in saying, that no simrilar act will be
passed relating to other indu.stries, when we consider and
study the nature and effect of the Act in question.
As is well known, railroading is a quasi-public
business, and one to a greater or less degree effecting the
interests of the country at large, so that Congress may act
in this case in a restrictive manner, which if used toward
most other enterprises, conducted with private capital, would
be highly unconstitutional. The constitutional right of the
Legislature to pass the Act is given by Sec. 8 of Art. I of
the Constitution of the United States, and by which Congress
is given the power "To regulate commerce with foreign nat-
ions, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes'
The extent of the power which this section intended
to confer may be ascertained by e:amiining the debates in the
Constitijtional Convention, as reported in the "Federalist".
2"It was intended", said the learned judge in Cook v. State of
Pennsylvania, (97 U. S. 566), in his allusion to the power
conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce, "to guard against
any taxation by the States which would interfere ith the
freest interchange of corimodities among the people of the
differeiit States."
The 9th Sec. of Art. I of the Constituttion foroids
any tax or duty to be laid upon goods passing between the
States. One State shall have an equal right with another,
and no preference may be shown.
By the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States it is provided that, "No person sball be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." So it would be clearly unlawful
for Congress, in the exercise of its power to try and force
roads to continue business at a loss, or to establish such
low rates as to render profits impossible. Coming, as we
have, upon the question of rates, a question most important
under the Act, I shall spend my time in a treatment of this
subject,- not the entire subject of rates hoxever,- but to
that division found in the 4th Sec. of the Act, and what is
familiarly termed "the long and short haul clause".
The construction of this section is constantly
brought before the Commission and is one necessitating much
care and attention. This section of the Act, as enacted by
Congress, reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this Act to charge or receive
any greater compensation, in the aggregate, for the transpor-
tation of passengers, or of like kind of property, under sub-
stantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a short-
er than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same
direction, the shorter being included within the longer dis-
tance; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any
common carrier within the terms of this Act, to charge and
receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer
distance. Provided, however, that upon applicaticn to the
Commission appointed under the provisions of this Act, such
common carrier may in special cases, after investigation by
the Commission, be authorized to charge less for longer than
for shorter distances, for the transportation of passengers
or property; and the Commission may from time to time pre-
scribe the extent to which such designated common carriers
may be relieved from the operation of this section of this
Act."
Before this Act came into force, the rates through-
out the country were regulated entirely by the proprietors of
the different roads, and, in a way, as best suited their in-
terests and welfare. During the first year or so after this
enactment by Congress, much was done in the direction of
bringing railroad rates into conformity with the general rule
of Sec. 4 of the Act.
In July 1888 the Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City
R. R. Co., a company havirC a line from Chicaro to St. Paul.
and Minneapolis, announced to the Commission (which is the
bodr a- poirted by the President, under this Act, and with the
authority to inquire into the manar-ement of al) common car-
riers) its purpose to reduce very larn ely its rates between
the termini of its road without reducing intermediate rates;
the effect of which would be to make the rate upon any cor-
signment to many of the intermediate stations greater than it
would be if carried through to the terminus.
The Company gave two reasons as justifying their
action. First,- That the intermediate rates were just and
reasonable, and therefore there was no injustice in maintain-
ing them. Second,- That the competition between the terminal
points forced them to greatly reduce their rates. The rates
as reduced were below what was reasonable, but the action of
the other companies made them all that was possible to obtain
and conditions were established dissimilar to those prevail-
ing at intermediate points, so as to justify the action and
avoid the statute.
The Commission immediately ordered a hearing. The
reason for the change of rates was shown to be as stated above,
which seemed strong, and was certainly plausible. But the
question involved was a question of the construction of the
Act. Its answer was to be arrived at on considerations of
what was probably the legislative intent. It was seen that
the circumstances and conditions relied upon as entitling the
carrier to make the exceptional rates were not ones growing
out of natural causes; ther were not the outcome of competi-
tion by water routes; there was no peculiarity of the line,
which would make rates at the termini, and at other stations,
relatively just; the only dissimilarity in the circumstances
and conditions which attended, was the sharp competition at
the termini, and which did not exist at intermediate points.
But this is a circumstances which is apt to exist
between many of the roads of the United States, and if this
is without the statute, the fourth section would be practi-
cally valueless. The legislature never intended the conse-
quence. It did not intend, as the Comnission believed, that
the carriers subject to the law should at pleasure make the
rule of the statute ineffectual. In the present case the
carrier under investi ,ation conformed to this conclusion, and
graded Its rates accordingly, and the objectionable rates
made by the carrier complained of were soon discontinued.
Many cases similar to the one above mentioned, come
constantly before the Commission, and the greatest care must
be exercised to prevent the fourth section from becoming
worthless.
In the Southern and South-western States the Com-
mission found that the roads were slow in corforming to the
new law, but this might be a very natural consecuence, as
water competition in that section of the country was very
brisk, and led to more trouble in establishing the rates.
Water competition is a subject of great interest, and one of-
ten arising under the section in question. The railroads are,
or at least were a few years ago, too much inclined to press
the competition to such a rate that the Commission would look
upon it as unreasonable and compel the railroad to change the
rate. The carriers by water have as much right to remunera-
tive rates as the carriers by land, and the carrier by rail
does not, therefore, make out a complete case when called
upon to justify extraordinary differences between his rate at
a point of water competition and other points, wh&en he shows
that at the former he made very low rates because otherwise
he could not have obtained the business. Perhaps in the
light of public interest he should not have had it, for un-
doubtedly the public good is best subserved when all the
carriers which the needs of the country require are suffered
to do business at a reasonable compensation, and where their
rates, as between all their points, are relatively as nearly
equal and just as under the circumstances they can be made.
The facts are sometimes overlooked in the making up of rail-
road rate sheets when water competition is to be taken into
account and its influence allowed for-
We have in the 4th Section of this Act the phrase,-
"after investirpation by the Commission." Let vs look briefly
at its meaning as decided by the Commission and the Federal
Courts.
In the case of In re Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (Com. Rep. Vol. I, p
31,)Judge Cooley says, "From the first there have been two
opinions regarding the proper construction of the provision
for exceptions to the 4th Section, one view being that no ex-
Oeption can be lawful unless made with the sanction of the
Commission; and the other,- apparently better supported on
the words of the statute,- that an order of relief is not
required when the circumstances and conditions are substan-
tially dissimilar, since the carrier in acting upon them,
would commit no breach of law, though he would be responsible
in case the circumstances were found to be misconceived."
Under this last view an order would be necessary
only in a case where the circumstances were plainly dissimi-
lar. To be sure, the carrier in acting runs the risk of hav-
ing the Commission decide the circumstances similar, in which
case he must stand the loss. The Conmission may decide against
the railroad company and issue an order which the company may
refuse to obey. In this case the Federal Court takes up the
matter, not alone upon the facts of the Cormiission's report,
but a new trial is ordered, which admits new matter as well
as the evidence in the former trial. If the court reverse
the decision of the Cormmissicn the railroad company may keep
its chanc-ed rates and is liable for no damages. The carrier
must be its own judge and judges in peril of the consequences.
We come now to a difficult, and by far the most
important, question arising under this section, and that is,-
what constitutes dissimilar circumstances, and does mere com-
petition create such a state?
We find in the case of The James & Mayer Buggy Co.
v. The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas R. R. Co., (5th Rep.
of Com. p 90) that water competition to Justify the greater
charge for the shorter distance must be competition in trans-
portation to the longer distance point and as to freight,
which, if not carried over the line on which it is located,
would reach slich destination by water transportation.
In t!)e 1892 reports the Commission decided that the
existence of actual competition which is of controlling
force, in respect to traffic important in amount, may make
out the dissimilar circumstances and conditions, entitling
the carrier to charge less for the longer than for the short-
er haul over the same line in the same direction, the shorter
being included in the longer distance; in the following cases.
1. Competition with carriers by water which are not
subject to provisions of the statute.
2. Competition with foreign or other railroads which
are not subject to statute.
3. In rare cases of competition between railroads
which are subject to statute, when strict application of the
general rule of statute would be destructive of legitimate
competition.
Turning our attention to the first of the above
three classes of competition, water competition, we find lit-
tle disagreement among the decisions. In the case of the
Board of Trade of Chattanooga v. East Tennessee, Virginia &
Geor;ia R. R. Co., found in the 1893 reports, it is held that
where actual water competition rates my be fixed the corn-
petition must, however, be of a controlling factor, and the
9mere fact that a point is situated on a stream is held in the
case of W. 0. Hartwell v. Colutmbus & Western R. R. Co., (1
I. C. Rep. 631) as not sufficient of itself to justify the
lesser charge for a lon :er raul to such a point; but competi-
tion, as stated above, must be actual, of controlling force,
and in respect to traffic important in amount, in order to
avoid the 4th Section.
There sometimes arise cases where the rail and wat-
er competition between shorter distances is of greater force
than between the longer. In this case the Commission holds
tine railroad not Justified in charging lower rates to the
longer than to the shorter hauls.
Not alone must there be competition between rail
and water, but it must be of some controllinl- force. The
article must be one which thne railroad ":,ould naturally carry
and the competition must be real. There mit't be dissimilar-
ity of circumstances with one road, which would not occur
with another. Circutmstances and conditions that may be con-
sidered in estimating the dissimilarity created by water com-
petition are:- the character of the roads, the character of
the traffic, large number of empty cars moving in the direc-
tion in which the traffic must be taken, and legitimacy of
the competition by the rail carrier.
In cases where a lower rate must be made or cause
an abandonment of the business, 'i.c whIch affords some profit
above costs of management, ?_-i d or's no injustice to other
patrons, this would be legitimate competition; but where the
low rate causes the running of the road at a loss, and im-
poses a burden uwon similar traffic at other points in such a
case, trie competition would be deemed destructive and illeg-
it imate.
We find many marked instances of xater competition
in thIis country, but per-q.ps no better example can be found
than that between New York City and Boston. Betvween these
two cities there is an iimense amount of traffic daily, and
it would be .,ost unjust if the rail -aas not allowed to fix
prices so as to compete with the water. The Commission
grants this case as one showing circumstances dissimilar and
tience allow the railroads to lower their rates so as to com-
pete with the boats. Just out of Boston is the town of Read-
ville, being situated eight .niles inland, where the water
competition does not reach. Suit was brought by this town to
compel the railroad to reduce their rates to the Boston rates,
but the Commission held that to thei town the competition
did not flow and the rates need not be changed.
When circumstances arise under the 4th Section
which are such as the Commission would decide dissimilar,
there i-ay be lesser rates to longer than to shorter distances,
but in no case must there be prejudice or advantage shown to
one person, company, firm or corporation, over another.
In some cases the conditions and differences in the
advantages of one road over another may be artificial and un-
natural, in which case there is a continued reduction of rates
and this is not undesirable; but where the advantages are
natural and real which one region has and enjoys over anotler,
such contiriuir1g disturbances of rates should not be inaugc-
rated, especially when thle charges are connodity rates, not
shown to be unreasonable in themselves.
Another good exauple of water competition in this
country is shown in the traffic carried on between the cities
on the Pacific and those in our eastern states. The Com-
mission holds that as to such articles as would be carried by
water unless the railroads were allowed to fix their rates so
as to compete with the boats,- as to such, the 4th Section
might be avoided; but as to that class which would still seek
the rail, rather than the water transportation, even though
the rail rates remained unchanged,- as to such, the rates
must remain fixed, and any violation of this rule is unjust
discrimination against the intermediate towns compelled to
pay the higher class rate on the same article.
Another case came before the Commission, the com-
plaint alleging that higher rates were charged from New York
to Chattanooga than to Memphis and Nashville, which are on
the same line and in the same direction and being at a great-
er distance. There was found to be water competition of con-
trolling force in case of Memphis, and so they were justified
in asking lower rates to their city, but as to Nashville, no
competition exists and any greater charge for transportation
to Chattanooga than to Nashville would be in violation of the
4th Section of this Act.
Numerous cases of water competition might be cited,
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but they are all so similar in nature that it seems of little
necessity. 'Je find water traf-Cic of great importance in this
country, which comes naturally from the resources found here.
Much trade is carried on on the great lakes and rivers, which
causes numerous cases of competition with the railroads, and
makes this question a most important one.
Other than in competition with carriers by water,
the circumstances allowing less to be charged for longer ti-an
for shorter distances, is where competition is with foreign
railroads or roads not subject to the provisions of this stat-
ute, also in rare cases of competition between roads subject
to the statute, when str-ct application of the general rule
of the statute would destroy rightful competition.
Competition in these cases, as in water competition,
must be real and actual, not a possibility of competItIon.
h-ere the same carrier operates two parallel lines, the low
charges on one road should not be made up by high rates on
the other. This would result in much damage to the corLnmunity
of the second road, and would finally result in loss to the
road, for a railroad is greatly regulated in its success by
the prosperity of the surrounding conmunity. A carrier shall
not establish rates on the different branches of its road, so
as to draw trade to one particular locality, which would nat-
urally run elsewhere. Such preference is not excused on the
grounds of competition.
I have said that in case of competition with a
foreign road, rates might be regulated accordingly, but this
13
is not so in every case as the foreign road oft-t'mes agrees
with the rates of the United States roads. This is so in the
run from San Francisco to Denver and to Kansas City. Until
recently Canadian competition compelled a lower rate from San
Francisco to Kansas City than to Denver, but now that the for-
eign road has .adopted our rate, competition is no longer in
force.
Perhaps on this question of competition with for-
eign roads, no better and simpler case could be cited than
one occuring at the time of the World's Fair. The Rome,
Watertown & Ogdensburg R. R. had a rate to Chicago and return
of %36.00. After the opening of the Fair the Canadian roads
established a rate from the above places to Chicago and re-
turn of ?24.00. The Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg road then
made a rate of $25.75. The large traffic of foreigners to
the Fair necessitated the use of all roads to Chicago to in-
sure safety and convenience of visitors. On applying to the
Commission the Rome, 7,atertown & Ogdensburg road was relieved
from the operation of the 4th Section of the Act, during the
continuance of the Fair. If this had not been granted it
would have been a great injustice to the road and an injury
to the United States, for if our rates were compelled to re-
main fixed, most of the World's Fair traffic from tbe East
would have been over the Canadian roads.
If in the creation of competition the circumstances
and conditions have been established by the carrier himself,
or are such as might have been avoided by a reasonable exer-
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tion and effort on his part, then in these cases, even though
the circumstances and conditions are not of his creation and
could not be obviated by reasonable effort on his part, in
this case he is justified in regulating his rates to prevent
a loss to the road.
Rates can never be arbitrarily charged by the car-
rier. They must be adjusted with regard to the 4nterests of
the public as well as the carrier. Rates should always be
comparatively reasonable; that is where competition exists,
and where it does not there should be some reasonableness in
the comparative charges. Such a competitive rate should nev-
er be charged as to make the carrier run its road at a loss,
and on the other hand a rate high beyond all reason should
never be charged. The more even the rates for the longer and
shorter distances, the better satisfied will be the community,
and I think I am safe in saying,- the more prosperous will be
the road. If lower rates are charged for a longer than for a
shorter haul, and a complaint follows, the carrier will pro-
bably aver substantial dissimilarity in circumstances and
conditions under the 4th Section, as justifying the greater
charge for the shorter distance, and he must show by his
pleading that the conditions are dissimilar, but upon an ap-
plication for relief under the 4th Section proviso, the car-
rier is not limited by such a rule of evidence and may pre-
sent to the Commission every material reason for an order in
his favor.
C 0 C T, U S I 0 T
Were we to look at all the cases which arise under
"the long and short haul clause" we would undertake an end-
less task; suffice to say that we have viewed some of the
most important ones. From the first much complaint arose
against the operation of this Section of the Act, and seemed
from the start to be increasing until this last year, when
signs of less dissatisfaction appeared. Certain it seems
that the operation of this Section cannot fail to work good
upon the country. Pates are now fairly proportional between
the local communities and the great centers. The result
seems to be greater satisfaction to the local communities and
this is accomplished without affecting the great centers of
commerce, and it seems that the outcome cannot but be benefi-
cial to the carriers themselves. Nothing is more desirable
to a railroad, than that its patrons should believe its rates
to be just; in fact, the success of the road is largely due
to the sentiment of the people along its line. Let the rates
remain different between the terminal points and local towns,
as have been cases in the past, and a feeling of dissatis-
faction will arise all along the line. The towns come to a
standstill, manufactories close; slowly but surely the town
once brisk in trade fades away. Can a railroad remain pros-
perous with this happening all along its line, or is the
prosperous road the one running through the busy and hustling
community? This question answers itself.
During the last year most of the complaint has come
from the NTew England States, with special reference to the
City of Boston. The idea that this section effects the int-
erests of Boston differently from Tew York or any other com-
mercial center, seems unfounded and the fact that no com-
plaint is heard from the railroads about Poston seems almost
conclusive proof that the industries are not effected, for as
stated above, the prosperity of the community is sure to reg-
ulate the profits of the road.
Previous to the passage of the Tnterstate Commerce
Act, and between the years 1850 and 1885, seventeen of the
States of the Union had by statute made illegal the charging
of a higher rate for a shorter than for a longer distance.
Some of the provisions were broad and general, while others
were narrow and failed to cover all cases. Vrhen this Act was
passed in 1887 by Congress, several States, (including Tiss-
ouri, Minnesota and NTebraska), passed statutes in general
harmony with the Federal laws, and others have since done tle
same.
From the fact that one half of the States of the
Union, by enactments covering almost half a century, have de-
clared the principles of the long and short haul clause to
be just, and for the public interest; from the fact that the
enactments have remained in force, and that no cry has been
heard from either the people or the railroads; is it not
reasonable to think that the result of the 4th Section of the
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Interstate Commerce Act will be the general promotion of the
welfare of this dountry?
At the time the Act went into force there were num-
erous cases where less was charged for the longer haul than
for the shorter, and so it was cautiously, and with regard to
the existing state of things, that this law was to be put
into force.
Exceptions were in some cases made to the law, and
the Commission always acted as it deemed wise. The then ex-
isting differences in rates have been slowly abolished and I
cannot doubt that if the carriers by rail shall accept this
principle as being clearly right and just, and proceed to
eliminate those cases where greater charges are paid for a
shorter distance, for the same goods over the same line, and
in the same direction, than for a like longer distance, that
it will not only be of benefit to the public, but also to
the railroads themselves.
I
